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WHAT IS IP FOR? EXPERIMENTS IN LAY 
AND EXPERT PERCEPTIONS 
GREGORY N. MANDEL† 
INTRODUCTION 
The normative justifications for intellectual property (“IP”) 
law are richly debated.  Some policymakers and experts argue 
that intellectual property should serve utilitarian goals, while 
others contend that the law should seek to protect natural rights 
or expressive ends.  Such debates have historically lacked data 
concerning how human actors in the IP system actually conceive 
of the law.  This Essay examines the results of experiments on 
the understanding of IP law for two critical components of the IP 
system: the public at large and IP attorneys.  The results raise 
significant concerns about the legitimacy and function of IP law 
under any of its traditional justifications. 
Regardless of IP law’s policy objectives, how people 
understand the law is crucial to the success of the IP system.  
This is true both for creators who obtain IP rights and IP 
consumers who may be regulated by those rights.  From the 
consumer perspective, the ease of copying enabled by modern 
technological advances means that voluntary compliance is 
necessary in order for IP law to significantly achieve its goals, 
whether IP law serves consequentialist or deontist ends.  This 
practical reality may be clearest under a utilitarian approach: 
any resources that IP owners have to expend to enforce their 
rights will reduce their ex ante incentives to engage in creation, 
dissemination, and commercialization in the first instance.  
Voluntary user compliance is also critical for natural rights and 
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expressive conceptions.  Widespread copying will chip away at 
owners’ natural rights and will limit the ability of authors and 
inventors to express themselves. 
In addition to these consumer-oriented effects on the IP 
system, probing people’s understanding of IP law also yields 
valuable information concerning creators.  Again, this insight is 
clear for an incentive model: IP law can only incentivize desired 
behavior if people know the law or are operating in an 
environment where incentives are shaped by the law.  Similarly, 
if IP law is meant to better enable individuals to express their 
personalities and viewpoints, these objectives can only be fully 
achieved if individuals have some understanding of the law and 
its potential protection.  Finally, creators can only enforce their 
natural rights if they are aware of them.  The relationship 
between creators’ understanding and the success of IP law varies 
by industry and context, but is an important piece of the puzzle 
under any of the IP models. 
The results of the experiments discussed here raise critical 
questions for the nexus between IP law’s means and ends.  The 
studies of popular perceptions of IP law reveal that the most 
prevalent perception does not align with any of the commonly 
accepted bases.  Rather, the modal response is that IP law exists 
to prevent plagiarism.  The study of IP attorneys displays much 
greater alignment with an incentivist approach to IP rights.  
That being said, even here there is still variation in this 
conception and in how IP conceptions align with opinions on the 
strength of protection. 
The varying conceptions of IP law exposed in these studies 
presents challenges both for the ability of the law to function as 
desired and for the legitimacy of the IP system.  The disconnect 
between attorneys who help operate the IP system and lay IP 
creators and users who act within it presents fundamental 
challenges under each of the traditionally conceived bases. 
This Essay develops in three parts.  Part I explores the 
incentives, natural rights, and expressive bases for IP law as well 
as the implications of these bases for creators and users of IP 
works.  Part II reports the results of several studies on IP 
perceptions among lay individuals and IP attorneys.  Part III 
discusses the implications of the results for the functioning and 
the perceived legitimacy of the IP system. 
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I. THE NEXUS BETWEEN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY’S MEANS 
AND ENDS 
A. Theories of Intellectual Property Law 
How people understand IP law is crucial to the law’s success 
under any of IP law’s traditionally conceived normative bases.1  
The IP Clause of the United States Constitution grants Congress 
the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts” 
by enacting copyright and patent laws.2  Consistent with this 
consequentialist framework, the dominant view of IP law and 
policy in the United States, particularly in the copyright and 
patent context,3 has generally been that the law exists in order to 
incentivize creative activity.4  This utilitarian incentive 
perspective has been repeatedly affirmed by the United States 
Supreme Court,5 and by experts in both legal and economic 
 
1 Gregory N. Mandel et al., Intellectual Property Law’s Plagiarism Fallacy, 2015 
B.Y.U. L. REV. 915, 917–19 (2015); Portions of Section I.A are drawn from this 
previous work. 
2 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
3 This analysis focuses on copyright and patent law because the studies 
discussed below are primarily directed to copyright and patent law issues. The 
(limited) trademark results are also discussed. Like copyright and patent law, 
trademark law is primarily supported based on consequentialist rationales, here to 
reduce consumer search costs and potential confusion, and, related, to incentivize 
producers to invest in the quality and distinction of their products and services. 
ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL 
AGE 765–66 (6th ed. 2012); Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of 
Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1858–59, 1863 (2007). 
4 See Mark A. Lemley, Faith-Based Intellectual Property, 62 UCLA L. REV. 
1328, 1328 (2015) (“The traditional justification for intellectual property (IP) rights 
has been utilitarian.”); Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual 
Property, 98 VA. L. REV. 1745, 1746–51 (2012) (“According to the dominant American 
theory of intellectual property, copyright and patent laws are premised on providing 
creators with . . . incentive[s] to create artistic, scientific, and technological 
works . . . .”); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. 
REV. 1575, 1597–99 (2003) (“[C]ourts and commentators widely agree that the basic 
purpose of patent law is utilitarian: We grant patents in order to encourage 
invention.”). 
5 E.g., Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l., 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (“We 
have ‘repeatedly emphasized this . . . concern that patent law not inhibit further 
discovery by improperly tying up the future use of’ these building blocks of human 
ingenuity.” (alteration in original) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus 
Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1301 (2012))); Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1305 (“[T]he promise 
of exclusive rights provides monetary incentives that lead to creation, invention, and 
discovery.”); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 223 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he grant of exclusive rights [in the IP clause] is intended to encourage the 
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fields.6  The rationale for the incentive theory of IP law is that 
providing authors and inventors with the potential for IP rights 
will induce them to engage in greater innovative activity than 
they otherwise would, from the creation to the production to the 
commercialization of intellectual works.7 
The incentive theory of IP law is fundamentally behavioral.  
It is based on the premise that the existence of potential IP 
rights will cause human beings to change their actions.8  Under 
this perspective, the law can only achieve its desired ends either 
if people know the law ex ante or if they operate in a system 
designed by others who know the law, such as employees in a 
research laboratory.  Understanding how people comprehend IP 
law is therefore a critical component for studying the efficacy and 
efficiency of the law in an incentive framework.9 
Though the prevailing conceptual basis for IP law is a 
consequentialist incentive theory, other theories of IP rights also 
receive support.  For example, a number of scholars rely on John 
 
creativity of ‘Authors and Inventors.’ ”); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 
Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (“The primary objective of copyright is not to reward 
the labor of authors, but ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.’ ”) 
(alteration in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8)); Harper & Row, 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (“[C]opyright supplies 
the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”); Sony Corp. of Am. v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (granting patents and 
copyrights “is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors”); 
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (“The sole 
interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring the [copyright] 
monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the public . . . .” (internal quotation 
mark omitted) (quoting Fox Film Corps. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932)). 
6 E.g., Fromer, supra note 4, at 1750–51 (“The Supreme Court, Congress, and 
many legal scholars consider utilitarianism the dominant purpose of American 
copyright and patent law.” (footnote omitted)); Burk & Lemley, supra note 4, at 1597 
(“While there have been a few theories of patent law based in moral right, reward, or 
distributive justice, they are hard to take seriously as explanations for the actual 
scope of patent law.” (footnote omitted)); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, 
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 4 (2003) (“Today it is 
acknowledged that analysis and evaluation of intellectual property law are 
appropriately conducted within an economic framework that seeks to align that law 
with the dictates of economic efficiency.”). 
7 MERGES ET AL., supra note 3, at 11–17; Christopher A. Cotropia & James 
Gibson, The Upside of Intellectual Property’s Downside, 57 UCLA L. REV. 921, 926–
27 (2010). 
8 See Mandel et al., supra note 1, at 917–18. 
9 See Gregory N. Mandel, To Promote the Creative Process: Intellectual Property 
Law and the Psychology of Creativity, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1999, 2000 (2011) 
(discussing how intellectual property law can influence creativity). 
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Locke’s labor theory of property rights and similar concepts to 
argue that authors and inventors should hold natural rights in 
their creative works.10  This deontological perspective views 
individuals as automatically entitled to the fruits of their labor.11  
Natural rights theory reasons that a creator is morally entitled to 
control the copying and distribution of inventions or artistic 
creations produced as a result of the creator’s own labor and 
effort.12 
Other scholars contend, often based on reasoning from Kant 
and Hegel, that IP rights can advance expressive ends.13  Under 
this rationale, IP rights should be protected to promote greater 
personal freedom, human flourishing, and cultural  
 
 
 
 
 
10 See, e.g., ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 33–41 
(2011); RICHARD A. SPINELLO & MARIA BOTTIS, A DEFENSE OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS 3 (2009); Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: 
Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE 
L.J. 1533, 1540 (1993); see generally Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual 
Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 296–330 (1988) (discussing Locke’s labor theory as it 
relates to IP rights). Some scholarship not only supports the natural rights theory of 
IP, but also makes a historical argument that this was an originally understood 
basis for such rights in the United States. PAUL D. CLEMENT ET AL., THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION 1 
(2012) (“[F]rom its inception[,] copyright was seen not merely as a matter of 
legislative grace designed to incentivize productive activity, but as a broader 
recognition of individuals’ inherent property right in the fruits of their own labor.”); 
Adam Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents: An Intellectual History, 1550-
1800, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1255, 1257 (2001) (“It is my intention, nonetheless, to offer a 
modest challenge to the prevailing view that the ideas of the natural rights 
philosophers did not influence the early development of patent law.”). 
11 MERGES, supra note 10, at 33–41. 
12 See Gordon, supra note 10, at 1543 (“[A]ll persons have a duty not to interfere 
with the resources others have appropriated or produced by laboring on the common. 
This duty is conditional, and is a keystone in the moral justification for property 
rights.” (footnote omitted)); Hughes, supra note 10, at 297 (“Locke proposes 
that . . . there are enough unclaimed goods so that everyone can appropriate the 
objects of his labors without infringing upon goods that have been appropriated by 
someone else.”). 
13 See, e.g., Fromer, supra note 4, at 1754–56; Margaret Jane Radin, Market-
Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1894–95 (1987); Hughes, supra note 10, at 
330–65. 
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development.14  Just as individuals use physical property, such as 
homes or clothing, to express their personality,15 an individual’s 
intellectual creations may be used in a similar manner.16 
Expressive theories of IP law, like the incentive theory, can 
only succeed if people are knowledgeable of their rights or 
potential rights.  The human flourishing and personal freedom 
that IP rights in one’s creations may provide can only be 
promoted if people are aware of such rights.  If creators are 
ignorant of their IP rights, there is little that law can do to 
advance or protect their expression. 
For natural rights conceptions, the link between the ends 
sought and knowledge of IP rights is weaker.  Creators do not 
need to know about potential rights ex ante in order for those 
rights to vest in creations of the mind ex post.  Even here, 
however, knowledge of rights is necessary to achieve protection.  
In order to fully defend natural rights, people must know that 
they exist.  Furthermore, as discussed in more detail in the 
following section, how IP users understand the law and operate 
within the system will significantly affect the scope of creators’ 
natural rights. 
B. Lay and Expert Populations 
The studies examined here involve two different populations: 
lay individuals and IP attorneys.  Understanding lay perceptions 
of IP rights sheds light on the functioning of the IP system from 
several perspectives.  Lay perspectives will most directly 
represent the view of many IP users, as well as the perspective of 
 
14 See, e.g., Fromer, supra note 4, at 1754–56; Radin, supra note 13, at 1892; 
Hughes, supra note 10, at 330–65. 
15 See Nestor M. Davidson, Property and Identity: Vulnerability and Insecurity 
in the Housing Crisis, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 119, 119–20 (2012). 
16 See Fromer, supra note 4, at 1765–81 (discussing how authors and inventors 
use their creations to express themselves). Consistent with these alternative notions 
of IP rights, several European countries endow authors with certain “moral rights” 
in their works. See Jane C. Ginsburg, “European Copyright Code” – Back to First 
Principles (With Some Additional Detail), 58 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 265, 278–80 
(2010); ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A MORAL 
RIGHTS LAW FOR THE UNITED STATES 37–47 (2010). These moral rights can include a 
right of attribution—requiring that the author of a work be identified—and a right 
of integrity—permitting the author of a work to prevent others from distorting the 
work in a way that would injure the author’s reputation. Ginsburg, supra, at 278–
80. 
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certain creators, jurors, some judges, and various policymakers.  
Each of these categories of actors within the IP system is 
discussed in turn.17 
Public perceptions of IP rights represent the state of mind 
for many IP consumers.  The ease of copying enabled by modern 
technological advances, combined with the high transaction costs 
of enforcement, makes widespread voluntary compliance 
necessary for the IP system to function as desired under any of 
its potential bases.18  Common understanding of IP rights are 
critical to IP rights compliance and enforcement in any field that 
is characterized by heavy lay use and the inability of owners to 
unilaterally control copying behavior. 
Lay perceptions also characterize the perspective of a 
number of potential IP creators.  From an incentive perspective, 
and to some extent an expressive one, these perceptions help 
shape this population’s decisions concerning what activities to 
engage in.  Although many potential IP producers will have more 
sophisticated knowledge of IP law than the average member of 
the public, a substantial pool of creators operate on the basis of 
general background knowledge.  This pool includes many 
individual creators, who generally do not have sophisticated 
knowledge of IP law, but still make substantial contributions to 
valuable copyright and patent activity.19  This pool also includes 
numerous creators and decision makers at smaller companies, 
such as start-up entities and small firms, where individuals often 
lack significant expertise in IP law.20  Creative activity within  
 
 
 
17 Portions of the following discussion are drawn from Gregory N. Mandel, The 
Public Perception of Intellectual Property, 66 FLA. L. REV. 261 (2014). 
18 See Tom R. Tyler, Compliance with Intellectual Property Laws: A 
Psychological Perspective, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 219, 224 (1997) (suggesting, 
based on experimental research, that gaining voluntary cooperation with the law 
will increase the effectiveness of IP law). 
19 See John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 465–66 (2004) 
(reporting that a sample of 1,300 U.S. patents included 482 individual inventors and 
small entity owners); Raymond Shih Ray Ku et al., Does Copyright Law Promote 
Creativity? An Empirical Analysis of Copyright’s Bounty, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1669, 
1711–12 (2009) (discussing a potential increase in size of the “creative class,” made 
up of individual artists and authors). 
20 See Mark D. Janis & Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Law’s Audience, 97 MINN. 
L. REV. 72, 84 (2012) (rejecting the notion that those who operate under the patent 
system are all sophisticated concerning the content of patent law). 
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these firms is critical to the innovation landscape as research 
indicates that smaller firms are responsible for more significant 
innovation than larger firms.21 
The public perception of IP law also reflects the mindset of 
most jurors deciding IP cases.  For example, in the initial U.S. 
trial in the ongoing Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. 
litigation,22 it appears that the jury foreman, who is widely 
recognized to have played a lead role in the jury deliberation, did 
not accurately understand patent law, even after the judge’s 
instruction.23  Popular perceptions may also represent the 
understanding of some district court judges.  Many district court 
judges lack expertise in IP law and hear such cases 
infrequently.24  For some judges, these issues may be matters of 
first impression, and as a result, a more lay understanding of IP 
law may play some role in their initial perspective.  That being 
said, there are certainly other judges, such as those in the Patent 
Pilot Program,25 who have far greater knowledge of IP law. 
Finally, the public perception of IP is likely to influence and 
guide many lawmakers in determining their support for or 
opposition to particular IP law proposals.  This is true both on an 
individual preference level—that is, it is the perception that 
many legislators are expected to possess as individuals—as well 
as on a representative level because legislators are affected by 
the opinions and public discourse surrounding IP debates 
 
21 MERGES, supra note 10, at 210–12; Josh Lerner, The New Financial Thing: 
The Origins of Financial Innovations, 79 J. FIN. ECON. 223, 224 (2006). 
22 909 F. Supp. 2d 1147 (N.D. Cal. 2012), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 735 F.3d 
1352 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
23 Mike Masnick, Samsung/Apple Jury Foreman’s Explanation for Verdict 
Shows He Doesn’t Understand Prior Art, TECHDIRT (Aug. 30, 2012, 11:32 AM), 
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20120830/02063020214/samsungapple-jury-fore 
mans-explanation-verdict-shows-he-doesnt-understand-prior-art.shtml. For 
additional discussion of challenges facing jurors in deciding issues in patent cases, 
see Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration that the 
Hindsight Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1391, 1411–14, 
1439–44 (2006). 
24 See THE STATISTICS DIV., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2011 ANNUAL 
REPORT OF THE DIR.: JUDICIAL BUS. OF THE U. S. COURTS 128–30 (2012), http://www. 
uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2011/JudicialBusiness2011.pdf 
(reporting that approximately two percent of district court caseloads involve copyright 
and patent cases). 
25 Pub. L. No. 111–349, § 1, 124 Stat. 3674 (2011); see generally Judge Randall 
R. Rader, Addressing the Elephant: The Potential Effects of the Patent Cases Pilot 
Program and Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1105 (2013). 
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produced by the voting public, media, and general citizenry.  
These final effects bring this discussion full circle, as they 
indicate that public preferences for IP law will guide even 
sophisticated firms’ decision making to some extent.  Such firms 
will recognize that they operate in an environment where legal 
decision making, public policy, and their consumers are all 
influenced by the public perception of IP rights. 
The nexus between IP attorney perceptions of IP rights and 
the functioning of the IP system is more straight forward.  
Private attorneys advise their clients about how to operate under 
the law.  These attorneys’ understanding of the law influences 
the counsel that they provide to their clients.  In-house IP 
attorneys at firms within creative and innovative industries may 
play an even more significant role.  These attorneys’ beliefs about 
IP law help shape their firms’ decisions concerning what creative 
activity to engage in and how to protect it under the law.  
Therefore, knowing how people understand IP law is necessary to 
elucidate how both creators and consumers are expected to 
operate under the law. 
II. WHAT PEOPLE THINK INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IS FOR 
A. Lay Individuals: The Plagiarism Fallacy 
To investigate lay perceptions of IP law, Kristina Olson, 
Anne Fast, and I conducted a preliminary study exploring 
popular opinions on copying creative work product.26  Using 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk website, we recruited adult 
participants located in the United States to take part in the 
study.  Participants were asked an open-ended question:  “In 
general, do you think copying someone else’s creative product is 
acceptable or not?  Why or why not?”27  No reference was made to 
IP protection or IP law. 
In their responses to whether copying someone else’s creative 
product is acceptable, seventy-eight percent of respondents 
identified a moral or ethical basis.  Only six percent of the 
respondents mentioned any legal basis.  The explanations 
provided often focused on the concept of copying another’s work 
 
26 Portions of Section II.A are drawn from Mandel et al., supra note 1. 
27 Id. at 923. 
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as theft, but not from the perspective usually associated with IP 
rights.  Rather, copying was viewed as theft because it was 
perceived as taking credit for another person’s work.  Typical 
responses in this regard included, “ ‘Copying someone else’s work 
and taking credit for it is theft’ and ‘I do not think it is right.  
People should give credit where credit is due.’ ”28 
This study found that in an abstract context, participants 
tended to have a strong, negative reaction to copying another 
person’s work.  This reaction was rooted in moral and ethical 
disapproval of copying, not legal concerns.  The moral and ethical 
disapproval appeared closely tied to concerns about one person 
unduly taking credit for another person’s work.29 
A follow-up study focused on the public’s perception of the 
basis for IP rights.  Based on the traditionally identified 
justifications for IP rights and the results of the first study, we 
developed brief descriptions of four potential purposes for IP law: 
incentives, natural rights, expressive rights, and protection 
against plagiarism.  Participants were presented with these 
descriptions—in a random order—and were informed that they 
were “reasons why someone might support laws regulating the 
products of creativity and innovation.”30  Participants, recruited 
through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk website, were asked to “rank 
the statements based on how much you agree with them as a 
basis for intellectual property law.”31 
The results indicate that participants ranked plagiarism 
concerns as the leading basis for IP rights more often than any of 
the other commonly accepted bases (2(3) = 15.655, p = 0.001).32 
 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 924. 
30 Id. at 929. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 931; see infra Table 1. 
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Table 1. Lay individual perceived basis for IP rights. 
 
This pair of studies lend significant support to what we 
dubbed the “plagiarism fallacy”:  That the popular perception of 
IP rights is that they are designed to prevent plagiarism, not to 
provide incentives or to protect creators’ natural or expressive 
rights.  As discussed in Part III, the plagiarism fallacy in lay 
perception has significant implications for IP law and policy. 
B. Intellectual Property Law Attorneys 
Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Maggie Wittlin, and I are 
conducting a separate series of experiments on IP law attorneys’ 
attitudes towards IP rights and what motivates such attorneys to 
have particular positions about IP rights.  The participant pool 
was generated from practicing IP attorneys listed on 
Martindale,33 or on the websites of the top IP law firms as 
determined by Vault34 or U.S. News & World Reports.35  One 
hundred thirty IP attorneys throughout the United States took 
part in this study. 
One question in the study queried the attorneys’ perceived 
basis for IP rights.  Answer options included descriptions based 
on incentives, natural rights, expression, and antiplagiarism 
rationales.  In addition to the justifications used in the public 
 
33 Intellectual Property Lawyers by State in United States, MARTINDALE, http:// 
www.martindale.com/intellectual-property/united-states-lawyers-states.htm (last 
visited Dec. 19, 2016). 
34 2015 Best Law Firms for Intellectual Property, VAULT, http://www.vault.com/ 
company-rankings/law/best-law-firms-in-each-practice-area?sRankID=20&rYear= 
2015 (last visited Dec. 19, 2016). 
35 Best Law Firms for Litigation – Intellectual Property, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REPORT, http://bestlawfirms.usnews.com/search.aspx?practice_area_id=55 (last 
visited Dec. 19, 2016). 
Top Basis N Percent 
Plagiarism 43 37.1 
Incentives 30 25.9 
Natural Rights 30 25.9 
Expressive 13 11.2 
FINAL_MANDEL 2/14/2017  10:47 PM 
670 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:659   
perception study, an additional option, “There is no good 
explanation for having IP rights and laws,” was included in this 
survey.36  The results from the IP justification question are 
displayed in Table 2.  The results show that IP attorneys’ 
perceptions of IP law differ significantly from those of the lay 
public. 
Table 2. IP attorney perceived basis for IP rights. 
 
IP attorneys overwhelmingly view IP rights as designed to 
serve incentive objectives.  This is not entirely surprising.  As 
discussed above, this is the dominant view of IP rights espoused 
by the United States Supreme Court and by IP experts.37  It 
appears that as individuals go through the process of learning 
about and practicing IP law, they come to believe in the 
incentives justification.  That being said, even for individuals 
who had been practicing law for some time, a small group still 
believe in the natural rights and plagiarism bases. 
Attorneys’ perceptions about the proper basis for IP rights 
correlated with their beliefs about how strong IP protection 
should be.  Those attorneys who perceived an incentives basis for 
IP rights believed that patent rights should be stronger than 
those who perceived a natural rights or plagiarism basis.  Those 
attorneys who perceived a plagiarism basis for IP rights believed 
that copyright rights and trademark rights should be stronger 
than those who perceived an incentives or natural rights basis. 
 
36 There was also an option for “Another reason,” which seven participants 
selected. 
37 See supra text accompanying notes 1–7. 
Basis N Percent 
Incentives 101 82.8 
Natural Rights 10 8.2 
Plagiarism 10 8.2 
None 1 0.8 
Expressive 0 0.0 
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The results indicate that the incentive basis for IP rights can 
function for sophisticated parties, that is, parties who have 
access to IP attorneys.  To the extent such attorneys are 
consulted, they are likely to advise their clients consistent with 
this consequentialist rationale for the law.  On the other hand, 
the results also indicate that the expressive and natural rights 
bases will have a particularly hard time functioning as accurate 
drivers of IP rights in the real world.  The implications of the 
study results for the operation of IP law are the topic of Part III. 
III. HOW POSITIVE PERSPECTIVES AFFECT NORMATIVE 
PREFERENCES 
Both popular and attorney perceptions of IP rights can have 
significant effects on how IP rights function in the world and on 
the perceived legitimacy of IP law.  These effects are explored in 
the following sections.38 
A. Popular Preferences for Weaker Intellectual Property Rights 
Understanding the popularly perceived justification for IP 
rights only tells part of the story about how the law plays out in 
society.  It is also important to comprehend how individuals react 
to potential IP rights in particular instances, regardless of the 
perceived basis for the rights.  Olson, Fast, and I conducted a 
third study that provided a more detailed examination of 
individual perceptions of and preferences for IP rights in specific 
contexts.  This study used vignettes to test six different fields of 
potential IP rights: medicine, electronics, software, books, music, 
and painting.39  Each vignette described a scenario depicting one 
person copying another person’s idea, expression of an idea, or 
completed creative product.  Four hundred forty-three adults 
located in the United States took part in this study, again 
recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk.  Forty percent 
were female and the age range of participants was nineteen to 
seventy-eight years old (Mage = 33.84, SD = 12.08). 
 
 
38 Portions of Part III are drawn from Mandel et al., supra note 1. 
39 Id. at 934. The subject matters tested thus explored various areas of 
copyrightable and patentable works, but did not explore trademark protection. 
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The results revealed that the general public tends to believe 
that IP laws are too strong.  Across scenarios, participants 
believed that copying should be allowed to a greater extent than 
they believed IP law permits and to a greater extent than the law 
actually provides.40 
The disconnect between public preferences and IP law can be 
seen by examining participant responses across the 
idea/expression divide.  The studies tested whether people 
believe that ideas themselves, the expression of ideas, or 
complete creative products should be protected by IP rights.  
Unsurprisingly, we found that participants viewed it as most 
acceptable to copy an idea, followed by the expression of an idea, 
followed by copying the complete creative product.  Perhaps more 
surprisingly, although a significant majority of respondents in 
every subject matter believed that copying of ideas should be 
permissible, responses to the expression conditions were more 
mixed.  Though IP law would prohibit copying in each of the 
tested expression conditions, a majority of respondents believed 
that copying should be permitted in four of the six expression 
scenarios.  These scenarios included copiers who duplicated the 
chorus, additional lyrics, and some of the melody from a song; 
painted their own picture of an artist’s collage; used a new 
process to copy a patented vaccine; and reverse engineered and 
copied a patented semiconductor chip.  Summing across 
scenarios, a slight majority of respondents thought that copying 
of expression should be permitted in general. 
Even in the scenarios involving complete duplication of a 
creative product, the public was not always supportive of IP 
rights.  In one of the six scenarios, the majority of respondents 
believed that copying should be permitted, and in two other 
scenarios only a slight majority of respondents favored 
prohibiting copying.  Overall, we found that the public believes 
there should be weaker IP protection than the law provides.  We 
also found that popular preferences are highly context 
dependent, varying significantly across different subject matter 
domains. 
 
40 Id. at 937. 
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B. The Plagiarism Fallacy in Intellectual Property Law 
In addition to the conditions described above, Olson, Fast, 
and I also tested a variety of potentially mitigating 
circumstances.  For example, we investigated whether 
participants believed that copying should be permitted if the 
copier provided attribution to the original creator in relation to 
making an unauthorized copy.  While attribution is never a 
defense under IP law,41 attribution would mitigate plagiarism 
concerns. 
The results revealed a significant effect for attribution in all 
six of the subject matters tested.  Summing across vignettes, 
nearly two-thirds of the population believed that providing 
proper attribution to creators should enable the free copying of 
their IP works and inventions.42 
The public’s perception of the importance of attribution in 
copying permissibility is consistent with other research reporting 
that creators of intellectual works highly value the right of 
attribution.  For instance, in a series of experiments, Christopher 
Jon Sprigman, Christopher Buccafusco, and Zachary Burns 
found that IP “creators are willing to sacrifice significant 
economic payments in favor of receiving attribution for their 
work.”43  Similarly, Jessica Silbey conducted a series of in-depth 
interviews with a variety of people involved in the creative 
process and found that concerns about proper attribution and 
credit were pervasive.44  Collectively, these studies suggest that  
 
 
 
41 Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Pub. Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 142–43 (2d 
Cir. 1998). Nonattribution in the form of a disclaimer of any relationship with a 
referenced author could sometimes provide a defense to copyright infringement. For 
example, in a lawsuit for copyright infringement in a case involving a trivia book 
about the television show Seinfeld, the trivia book included the proviso that it “has 
not been approved or licensed by any entity involved in creating or producing 
Seinfeld.” Id. at 136. The court held that this was not enough to negate the factors 
militating against a finding of fair use in the particular case but left open the 
possibility that such a disclaimer could be relevant in a closer case. Id. at 141–46. 
42 Mandel et al., supra note 1, at 950. 
43 Christopher Jon Sprigman et al., What’s a Name Worth?: Experimental Tests 
of the Value of Attribution in Intellectual Property, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1389, 1390 
(2013). 
44 See generally JESSICA SILBEY, THE EUREKA MYTH: CREATORS, INNOVATORS, 
AND EVERYDAY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2015). 
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there is a significant disconnect between how IP law treats 
attribution—or fails to treat it—and how creators and the 
general public understand attribution and IP rights. 
These attribution results are contrary to current law.  A 
legal rule permitting attribution to defeat infringement liability 
would essentially eviscerate IP protection.  Such a doctrine would 
mean that one could freely copy another’s copyrighted work or 
patented invention simply by providing appropriate source credit 
to the actual creator.  An attribution defense would effectively 
replace copyright and patent law with law that simply prohibits 
plagiarism.  The majority of the public appears to favor such a 
practice, at least when queried about the permissibility of 
copying behavior in a factual context. 
Exposing the plagiarism fallacy in IP law helps elucidate a 
variety of previously puzzling common behaviors.  For example, 
millions of YouTube videos state, “no copyright intended” or “no 
copyright infringement intended,” in a legally misguided belief 
that such disclaimers provide protection against copyright 
infringement.45  The entry for “no copyright infringement 
intended” in the Urban Dictionary reads, “A phrase put in the 
title and/or description section of youtube [sic] videos by 
incredibly stupid people who don’t understand how copyright 
laws actually work.”46  These disclaimers provide no protection 
doctrinally, and therefore may not appear to make sense, but 
they are logical if one believes that IP rights are directed at 
prohibiting plagiarism. 
The plagiarism fallacy also likely helps to explain the 
apparent widespread failure of IP owners’ warnings and threats 
concerning IP infringement.47  Despite a proliferation of 
 
45 This data was gathered by performing a search on YouTube with the phrase 
“no copyright intended” and “no copyright infringement intended.” No Copyright 
Intended, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=no+copyright+ 
intended (last visited Dec. 19, 2016); No Copyright Infringement Intended, YOUTUBE, 
https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=no+copyright+infringement+intende
d (last visited Dec. 19, 2016). 
46 No Copyright Intended, URBAN DICTIONARY (Dec. 12, 2009), http://www.urban 
dictionary.com/define.php?term=No+copyright+infringement+intended&defid=4431
901 (last visited Dec. 19, 2016). 
47 Jenna Wortham, The Unrepentant Bootlegger, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/28/technology/the-unrepentant-bootlegger.html; 
Ernesto Van der Sar, RIAA Warns 1 Million Copyright Infringers a Year, 
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campaigns declaring, “infringement is theft” and “copyright 
violations are theft,” a substantial amount of infringing activity 
continues.48  This disconnect may exist because the popular 
understanding of these phrases is different from IP owners’ 
intended meaning.  Since the most common perception for the 
basis of IP law is antiplagiarism, many people likely view such 
proclamations as a basic declaration that one should not copy 
another person’s expression without attribution.  Thus, the 
average member of the public may agree with the statements 
verbatim, but the campaigns do not convey their intended 
meaning because the public has a different understanding of the 
word “theft” when used in such slogans. 
More broadly, the plagiarism fallacy findings shed new light 
on the common perception that the public tends to be ethically 
dismissive or indifferent towards IP rights.  Instead, this 
research indicates that experts have failed to comprehend how 
the public actually perceives IP law.  Understanding how the 
public perceives IP is critical not only for explaining user 
behavior, but also for understanding how the wide variety of 
creators who are unknowledgeable about IP law may react under 
the IP system. 
C. The Legitimacy of Intellectual Property Law 
The public’s preferences for weaker and different IP law 
creates challenges not only for achieving the socially desired 
objectives of the law, but also for the legitimacy of the law.  
Widespread disagreement with the substance of a law 
undermines its perceived legitimacy.49  Where laws are not 
perceived as legitimate, they are less likely to affect citizen 
behavior and less likely to achieve their desired goals.50 
 
TORRENTFREAK (July 4, 2010), https://torrentfreak.com/riaa-warns-1-million-copy 
right-infringers-a-year-100704. 
48 Peter J. Karol, Hey, He Stole My Copyright! Putting Theft on Trial in the 
Tenenbaum Copyright Case, 47 NEW ENG. L. REV. 887, 889–90 (2013); Donald P. 
Harris, The New Prohibition: A Look at the Copyright Wars Through the Lens of 
Alcohol Prohibition, 80 TENN. L. REV. 101, 103, 138–39 (2013). 
49 Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation, 57 
ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 375, 380–82 (2006); John M. Darley et al., The Ex Ante 
Function of the Criminal Law, 35 L. & SOC’Y REV. 165, 183 (2001); TOM R. TYLER, 
WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 45–46, 64 (2006). 
50 E.g., Robert MacCoun et al., Do Citizens Know Whether Their State Has 
Decriminalized Marijuana? Assessing the Perceptual Component of Deterrence 
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Popular legitimacy appears to be a particular challenge for 
IP law because there are disconnects both concerning lay 
perceptions of the basis for the law and, relatedly, concerning the 
strength of protection provided by the law.  The gap between 
public perception and the law raises questions concerning 
whether providing greater education about IP law could change 
people’s perceptions and consequently improve both the function 
and the legitimacy of the law.  The evidence is to the contrary. 
First, despite the proliferation of advertisements and 
warnings through a variety of media seeking to encourage 
respect for IP rights and reminding users of potentially strict 
penalties for illegal infringement, widespread infringing behavior 
continues.51 
Second, though there appears to have been a recent rise in 
attention to IP, the general public retains an extremely low level 
of knowledge about the law.  On average, the national sample of 
United States adults in our vignette study discussed above 
correctly answered only one-and-a-half questions better than 
chance on a basic ten question IP law quiz.52  This lack of 
knowledge about IP rights alone raises challenges for the law.53  
Equally important for our purposes, study participants’ 
knowledge of IP law did not affect their opinions about what the 
law should be.54  Both high-knowledge and low-knowledge 
individuals similarly believed that IP law should be weaker than 
it currently is.  This result is consistent with other studies that 
have found that people generally do not distinguish between 
what the law is and what they believe it should be.55 
 
Theory, 5 REV. L. & ECON. 347, 367–68 (2009) (discussing lack of support for the 
theory that changes in the law produces corresponding changes in behavior, based 
on data concerning citizens’ perceptions of marijuana possession legal penalties); 
Tyler, supra note 49, at 45–46, 64 (finding that people’s willingness to comply with 
the law is related to the perceived legitimacy of the law). 
51 Karol, supra note 48, at 889–90; Harris, supra, note 48, at 103; cf. Howard 
Latin, “Good” Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 41 UCLA L. REV. 
1193, 1194–95 (1994) (examining the psychological limitations of the effectiveness of 
product warnings in the tort context). 
52 Mandel et al., supra note 1, at 960. 
53 See, e.g., MacCoun et al., supra note 50, at 347–48 (explaining that marijuana 
prohibition laws cannot be effective deterrents if the public is unaware of them). 
54 Mandel et al., supra note 1, at 972. 
55 See Janice Nadler, Flouting the Law, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1399, 1410 (2005) 
(finding a correlation between people’s views about compliance with laws and their 
views about whether the laws were just); Tyler, supra note 49, at 45–46, 64 (finding 
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In a related vein, participants reported extremely limited 
experience with IP.  Only five percent of the study respondents 
identified having any experience working in connection with IP 
law and just six percent of respondents reported having 
“any . . . current or past experience in connection with 
intellectual property rights.”56  In reality, however, considering 
that the study platform was Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, “most 
participants were presumably regular internet users and very 
likely had ‘experience in connection with intellectual property 
rights’ almost daily.”57  Awareness of this interaction, however, 
like their knowledge of IP rights, was extremely limited. 
Third, in our most recent series of experiments, Olson, Fast, 
and I directly tested the ability of information to affect lay 
individuals’ perceptions about the basis for IP rights.58  
Participants read one of six arguments about the justification for 
IP protection.  These justifications included incentives, natural 
rights, expressive rights, plagiarism, commons, and a control 
group—no argument.  We ran the experiment in two different 
formats.  The first format involved short, one-paragraph 
descriptions of the justifications; the second involved extensive 
descriptions and defenses of the justifications that drew on 
references to the Constitution, famous historical creators—
Thomas Edison and Mark Twain—and current IP issues.  
Approximately six hundred adults located in the United States 
and recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk took part in 
this study.59 
The results are nuanced.  In general, participants were not 
responsive to any of the traditional justifications for IP rights.  
That is, participants who read the incentives, natural rights, or 
expressive rights descriptions did not tend to have different 
responses from those in the control group or from those who read 
 
that people’s perceptions of the legitimacy of law is greater when the law is 
consistent with people’s beliefs about what the law should be); see also Christopher 
Slobogin & Lauren Brinkley-Rubinstein, Putting Desert in Its Place, 65 STAN. L. 
REV. 77, 96–100 (2013) (finding mixed results for the relationship between 
compliance and belief in laws being just). 
56 Mandel et al., supra note 1, at 960 (alteration in original). 
57 Id. 
58 Anne A. Fast et al., Experimental Investigations on the Basis for Intellectual 
Property Rights, 40 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 458, 458 (2016). 
59 Id. at 461, 466. 
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a different one of these descriptions.  This was true both with 
respect to general IP rights questions and to questions about 
rights in specific IP contexts.  On the other hand, participants in 
the commons condition, and to a lesser extent participants in the 
plagiarism condition, tended to become less supportive of IP 
protection than those in the incentives, natural rights, expressive 
rights, and control conditions.60  In other words, arguments about 
the justification for IP rights appeared to display a one-way 
ratchet; they could convince participants that rights should be 
weaker, but not that rights should be stronger. 
Though the ecological validity of such experiments is always 
a question, this study indicates that IP law will continue to face 
significant legitimacy challenges under any of its traditionally 
conceived justifications.  Even with extensive explanations of 
incentive, natural rights, and expressive rationales for IP rights, 
people did not tend to change their opinions about the law.  In 
the real world, it is unlikely that even this strong an information 
campaign could be implemented, indicating that the gap between 
popular preferences and IP law will likely remain. 
CONCLUSION 
The studies on lay and IP attorney perceptions of IP rights 
paint a daunting picture of the nexus between IP law’s means 
and ends for each of its traditional policy justifications.  An 
incentives basis for IP law may be able to function relatively well 
for sophisticated parties in fields where IP owners can 
unilaterally control copying behavior to a significant degree.  
Fields fitting this profile may include the pharmaceutical 
industry, the semiconductor industry, and the theater-run 
motion picture industry.  In other contexts, the incentives basis 
appears to be significantly checked.  The natural rights and 
expressive bases for IP rights are likely even more challenged 
and can only succeed in very limited circumstances.  With few IP 
attorneys or lay individuals believing in such perspectives, it is 
unlikely that many creators or consumers operate under such 
conceptions.  While IP law may still be enacted consistent with 
these principles, such rationales are unlikely to affect behavior or 
produce the accurate enforcement of IP rights.  Finally, 
 
60 Id. 
FINAL_MANDEL 2/14/2017  10:47 PM 
2016] WHAT IS IP FOR? 679 
challenges to the legitimacy of IP law are likely to continue as 
long as the law is modeled on conceptions that are not widely 
shared. 
